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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED IN THIS PETITION 
POINT I 
THE COURTS HOLDING THAT THE CREDIT IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO AN UNJUST FORFEITURE IS CONTRARY TO 
SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS AND TO THE LAW 
APPLICABLE TO A TRANSFEREE WHO TAKES SUBJECT TO 
OUTSTANDING EQUITABLE CLAIMS AND INTERESTS. 
POINT II 
QUANTUM MERUIT OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT WAS NOT 
PLEADED NOR PROVED BY NEW WEST AND CANNOT BE 
THE BASIS FOR THE RECOVERY OF RENTAL VALUE. 
POINT III 
DAMAGES FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER WERE IMPROPER 
NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF LACK OF PROPER SERVICE ON 
MARGETTS BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF NO SERVICE ON HIS 
WIFE AND THE FAILURE TO QUALIFY UNDER THE STATUTE. 
POINT IV 
THE COURTS DEFERENCE TO THE LOWER COURT ON 
CREDIBILITY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY MISSED 
THE POINT THAT THE LOWER COURTS nNDINGS WERE 
NOT BASED ON CREDIBILITY BUT ON THE LEGAL ISSUE OF 
REASONABLENESS. 
STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED 
See Addendum to Brief of Appellant for full text of all statutes. 
I 
IN THE 
COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
NEW WEST FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a 
California corporation, successor-in-
interest to AMERICAN SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, a 
California corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
JOHN L. MARGETTS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 930450-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellant respectfully petitions the Court for a rehearing in this matter on the 
grounds that the Memorandum Decision filed October 20, 1994, appears to be based upon 
an incorrect assumption as to essential facts and a misperception of the law established by 
applicable cases. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 3, 1980, Margetts entered into an Exchange Agreement with 
Garden Falls Condominiums, the predecessor in interest of New West, by which Margetts 
agreed to exchange a condominium in Park City for a condominium in what later became 
known as Terrace Falls Condominiums at Third Avenue and "A" Street in Salt Lake City. 
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Because the Terrace Falls Condominiums had not yet been built, Margetts was given a Trust 
Deed on the Terrace Falls Condominiums as security for conveyance to him of the 
completed condominium. 
2. On December 9, 1981, Garden Falls Condominiums persuaded Margetts to 
enter into a new agreement, a Condominium Acquisition Agreement, with Terrace Falls 
Condominiums, a limited partnership, the new name for Garden Falls Condominiums, by 
which Margetts would receive credit towards the purchase of a designated condominium unit 
in the project of $200,000.00 plus 15% thereof per year from December 9, 1981 until the 
date of closing in return for a subordination of his Trust Deed against the project to 
construction financing (Exh.2). A new trust deed in favor of Margetts was recorded 
December 22, 1981 (Exh. 3). Other parties with claims similar to Margetts' also 
subordinated their liens against the property (R. 538, p.32). 
3. By September of 1984, the condominium project was only partially completed, 
the construction financing with American was in default and Terrace Falls Condominiums 
had agreed to deed the project to American in lieu of foreclosure upon obtaining releases 
of the liens of other creditors in order to avoid the negative publicity of a foreclosure and 
accomplish a smooth, quick and easy transition (R. 538, pp. 39-41). A written Real Property 
Purchase and Sale Agreement (Exh. 4) was prepared and eventually signed by which 
American purchased from Terrace Falls Condominiums the entire project including all 
personal and intangible property such as "the business of selling or leasing units, or the 
ownership or rental of condominiums," the name 'Terrace Falls," and "any other rights of 
[Terrace Falls] or its predecessor in interest in connection with the Property" (Exh. 4,K 2). 
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4. On September 6, 1984, Gerald Snow, an attorney, called Margetts' attorney, 
requesting Margetts to meet with Lee Stevens of American Savings & Loan, the construction 
lender on the Terrace Falls Condominiums, on September 12,1984 (R.539, p.292). This was 
followed by a letter from Gerald Snow, dated September 7, 1984, confirming this request 
(Exh. 5). 
5. At the meeting on September 12, 1984, Mr. Snow and Mr. Stevens of 
American Savings & Loan told Margetts that Terrace Falls Condominiums and its principals 
were insolvent and that American Savings and Loan was going to foreclose its first trust 
deed against the Terrace Falls Condominiums and cut off all of Margetts' rights therein 
unless it could obtain a release of all junior liens against the project, including Margetts' 
trust deed. Mr. Snow and Mr. Stevens offered Mr. Margetts $20,000.00 for a release of his 
trust deed against the condominium project. Margetts refused this offer and left the 
meeting. Mr. Snow called later to increase the offer to $50,000.00 or a credit of $150,000.00 
towards the purchase of a condominium (R. 539, pp. 203-4; R. 538, pp. 61-63). 
6. Mr. Snow prepared and delivered several agreements (Condominium 
Purchase Agreement, Settlement Agreement, General Release, and Request for 
Reconveyance-Exh. 6-9, 15), giving Margetts the $150,000.00 credit and made several 
requests of Margetts and his attorney over the next two months that the agreements be 
signed and returned because all other lien holders had settled and Margetts was holding up 
the whole settlement (R. 539, pp.268-274, 206-207; R. 538, p. 135). Margetts refused to do 
so. 
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7. Because Margetts was leaving town for two weeks and Mr. Snow was anxious 
to conclude a settlement with Margetts, Mr. Snow arranged a meeting with Margetts, without 
his attorney, on November 14,1984. Margetts again refused to sign the agreements (R. 538, 
pp.125-6; R. 539, p. 210). Mr. Snow asked him to return that afternoon at which time Mr. 
Snow thought he could present a better deal to him (R. 539, p. 211). 
8. Margetts met with Mr. Snow again that afternoon at which time he was 
presented with an additional agreement with Terrace Falls Condominiums (Exh. 10 and 16) 
which would give him an additional credit towards the purchase of the designated 
condominium unit of 20% of the proceeds of the sale of other units in the condominium 
project as an inducement to get him to sign the previously prepared condominium purchase 
agreement, settlement agreement, general release, and request for reconveyance. Mr. Snow 
assured Margetts that the other agreements would not be delivered until this twenty percent 
agreement was signed and that American Savings would be bound by that agreement. Mr. 
Margetts thereupon signed all the agreements (R. 538, pp. 139-140; R. 539, pp. 212-214). 
He further told Margetts that he would get what he wanted by that agreement, that only 
seven condominiums had to be sold to completely pay for his condominium, and that 
American Savings did not have to sign the agreement to be bound by it because American 
would be Terrace Falls Condominiums. 
9. Margetts' trust deed in the project was reconveyed (Exh. 11) and Terrace 
Falls Condominiums gave to American Savings and Loan a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure 
conveying the entire project to American and American took over the completion and 
operation of the project (Exh. 4). 
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10. These agreements called for the closing of the sale of the condominium unit 
to Margetts after it was ready for occupancy and certain specified finish items had been 
completed in the unit, which would be no later than June 30, 1985 (Exh. 6,11 6; Exh. 7,11 6). 
11. American did not complete the unit by June 30, 1985 and did not finish the 
unit as required by the agreement (Exh. 22, 24-27). Margetts paid some $9,234.00 of his 
own money to finish the unit (R. 465, p.3) and he was told by American's attorney to move 
into the unit on August 25, 1985 even though American did not have a certificate of 
occupancy and could not deliver title to Margetts (R.539, p. 226-8). 
12. After Margetts moved into the unit, American dismissed their security 
personnel on the project relying on Margetts5 presence in the project as security for the 
whole project (R. 539, p. 233). 
13. American did not form the owners association for the condominium project 
until September 1, 1987 and told Margetts not to pay any assessments, taxes, or rent on the 
unit (R. 539, pp. 233-5). 
14. In reliance on the twenty percent agreement signed as an inducement for 
Margetts to enter into the Condominium Purchase Agreement and other agreements, 
Margetts persuaded five of his acquaintances to buy condominium units in the project (R. 
539, p. 230). 
15. When American was finally prepared to close the transaction and convey 
title to Margetts, it refused to give him credit for 20% of the proceeds of units sold to 
purchasers obtained by Margetts or for the cost of finish items paid by Margetts. It also 
refused to allow him to select another unit as provided in the agreements. 
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16. On March 25, 1989, New West, as the successor-in-interest to American, 
caused a Notice to Quit to be mailed to Margetts demanding that he vacate the unit within 
five (5) days (R. 538, p. 178). 
17. When Margetts did not vacate the unit, New West commenced this action 
for unlawful detainer (R. 2-24) and Margetts filed a counterclaim asserting that he was 
entitled to a deed to the unit, that he was induced by fraud and deception to surrender his 
trust deed on the project and to pay an additional $134,283.00 for his unit and that he was 
entitled to a credit for the finish items paid for by him and further amounts for security 
services against the purchase price of his unit (R. 27-51). 
18. Trial was held November 14-16, 1989, resulting in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R. 512-20) and Judgment (R. 522-24), dated April 23, 1990, which 
judgment included rent prior to the Notice to Quit and prejudgment interest thereon as well 
as treble damages after the Notice to Quit and attorneys' fees incurred in obtaining 
possession of the condominium unit. 
19. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the case was transferred to the Court of 
Appeals and, after hearing, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower court 
for failure to make sufficient findings of fact and remanded the case on the issues of agency, 
fraud and remedies with instructions to "clarify in its ruling why both forfeiture and rent are 
being awarded" and "with leave to conduct such further proceedings as the trial court may 
deem appropriate." The Court of Appeals further stated !twe do not intend our remand to 
be merely an exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion already reached (R. 543-
45). 
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20. On remand, New West merely submitted supplemental findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to bolster and support the conclusion already reached and, without 
conducting further proceedings except oral argument by counsel, the lower court adopted 
those supplemental findings and conclusions with only minor changes in wording. The lower 
court did not enter any further findings on the issue of remedies and did not clarify why both 
forfeiture and rent were awarded (R. 851-862). New West submitted a form of judgment 
to the lower court which included an award of attorney's fees incurred after remand. After 
objection by Margetts, the lower court entered a new judgment on January 11,1993, striking 
out the award of attorney's fees incurred after remand, but again awarding New West a 
judgment in the amount of $32,031.00 for rental of the unit, prejudgment interest and treble 
damages, plus attorney's fees of $20,515.00 and terminating any interest of Margetts in the 
condominium and granting possession thereof to New West. The judgment also awarded 
New West additional prejudgment interest on the entire judgment to the date thereof (R. 
872-74). 
21. Upon reconsideration of the matter, this Court, by Memorandum Decision 
filed October 20, 1994, held: 
1) That the "$150,000 credit did not represent money or tangible property 
actually paid to American Savings that would be subject to unjust forfeiture in favor of 
American Savings . . . [and] does not equate to the cash payments that have been the subject 
of judicial intervention to set aside unconscionable forfeitures in the real estate contract 
context." [Memorandum Decision, page 3]. 
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2) That "Margetts is liable for the fair rental value for the period after he 
remained on the premises without permission, even absent a lease or similar possessory 
agreement. New West is therefore entitled to fair rental value on the basis of quantum 
meruit, even though no enforceable written or oral contract existed.1' [Memorandum 
Decision, page 3]. 
3) That "Margetts is liable for treble damages under the Utah unlawful 
detainer statute despite his contention that New West failed to comply with service 
requirements for the Notice to Quit as set forth in Utah Code ann. § 78-36-6 (Supp. 1994)." 
[Memorandum Decision, pages 3-4]. 
4) That "the trial court's findings are intellectually troubling because the 
court made judgments about the credibility and demeanor of witnesses three years after trial, 
as a matter of institutional necessity we have no choice but to defer to the trial court's 
determination in this respect." [Memorandum Decision, page 2]. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURTS HOLDING THAT THE CREDIT IS NOT 
SUBJECT TO AN UNJUST FORFEITURE IS CONTRARY TO 
SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS AND TO THE LAW 
APPLICABLE TO A TRANSFEREE WHO TAKES SUBJECT TO 
OUTSTANDING EQUITABLE CLAIMS AND INTERESTS. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision recognized the principle established in 
numerous Utah cases that an unconscionable forfeiture will not be allowed and a buyer, 
after defaulting on his contract, may recover from the seller the amounts received which do 
not bear a reasonable relationship to the seller's actual damages. The Court's decision also 
recognized the significant losses suffered by Margetts in the loss of his entire interest in the 
condominium, which represented a loss to him of over $300,000 but was a loss for which 
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American had agreed to credit him for $150,000. The Court, however, claims that the 
principle of unconscionable forfeiture does not apply because American did not receive any 
money or tangible property from Margetts in the amount of $150,000. It is submitted that 
this conclusion is contrary to both the spirit and substance of the Utah cases and to the law 
applicable to a transferee of property, such as American, who is not a bona fide purchaser 
and who, therefore, takes the property subject to all outstanding equitable claims and 
interests. 
First, one must realize that even though American did not receive cash or 
property from Margetts when the contract was entered into, it did receive something of 
substantial value to it. American agreed that it was worth $150,000 to it to obtain a release 
of Margetts' lien and to avoid the complications, costs, time and adverse publicity of a 
formal foreclosure as well as the prospects of a lengthy and expensive Chapter 11 
bankruptcy. Without Margetts' release of lien, the whole transaction with the developers of 
the project and with the other creditors would have fallen apart and American would have 
had to foreclose and go through a lengthy Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding that the 
developers had threatened. It knew that the value of the project would decrease a great 
deal more than the $150,000 during that process and that its expenses in that process would 
also be substantial. To agree to allow Margetts a credit of $150,000 was the equivalent of 
putting at least $150,000 cash into American's pocket. It is simply unrealistic to say that 
American did not receive anything of value. 
Second, after the forfeiture of Margetts' interest in the condominium, American 
received the entire interest in that condominium with no obligation to reimburse anything 
to Margetts. American, therefore, ended up with the $150,000 interest in the condominium 
that Margetts held which it could turn around and sell to another buyer. That, too, was the 
equivalent of putting $150,000 into American's pocket. To suggest that the principle of 
unconscionable forfeiture does not apply in such circumstances is to miss the whole point 
of the principle involved in these cases. 
It is true that most of the Utah cases which establish this principle recite that 
cash was paid by the buyer to the seller, a portion of which must be reimbursed. But the 
opinions in most of those cases emphasize the principle involved and do not necessarily 
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recite whether the payments made were in cash, credit or something else which the parties 
agreed had cash value. It is clear from those cases, however, that the principle applies 
whether or not the cash or other value was given or received by the original buyer or seller 
under the contract when an assignment has been made of either the buyer's or seller's 
interest. For example, in one of the most recent cases, Bellon v. Malnar. 808 P.2d 1089 
(Utah 1991), the court held that liquidated damages of $76,190.36 did not bear a reasonable 
relationship to actual damages of $50,132.13 and ordered the difference of $26,058.33 
returned to the buyer. In that case, however, it was not the original buyer who had paid the 
$76,132.13, who brought the suit and received the reimbursement of $26,058.33. It was an 
assignee of the buyer's interest, who made none of the contract payments and who 
apparently gave nothing to the buyer for his interest (at least the court's opinion does not 
disclose that anything was paid by the assignee for that interest), to whom the 
reimbursement was ordered! If the assignee of the buyer, who made no payments under the 
contract, can recover an unconscionable forfeiture from the seller, surely the buyer who 
made those payments can recover an unconscionable forfeiture from the assignee of a seller 
who receives the title to the property from his assignor. That principle would apply even 
when the seller's assignee who took over the seller's position in the property even though 
he did not receive any separate consideration for the agreement, as was the case with 
American. In L. Q. Development. Oreg. v. Mallorv. 98 Ore. App. 121, 778 P.2d 972 
(Ore.App. 1989), the buyers made the down payment on a purchase contract and several 
installment payments and then assigned their buyers' interest to the plaintiff, who continued 
to make payments to the seller. The seller who received all of the payments under the 
contract assigned the seller's interest to the defendant for no consideration. When a dispute 
arose over the contract, the buyers' assignee sued the seller's assignee for restitution of the 
payments made. The court determined that the contract itself was invalid and restitution 
should be ordered but the critical issue in that case was whether the seller's assignee, who 
received none of the payments, had a duty to make restitution of the money that both the 
buyers and the buyers' assignee had paid to the seller. The court held that the seller's 
assignee had such a duty in these words: 
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We hold that defendant has that duty. He holds the vendor's 
interest in the real property that purchasers expected seller to 
release to purchasers in exchange for their payments. Defendant is 
unjustly enriched, at least to the extent that he holds property that 
purchasers or plaintiff should have received. He has throughout had 
actual knowledge of the agreement and payments made to seller and 
her estate. He was involved in the negotiation and closing of the 
contract on seller's behalf. 
He also intended to step into seller's shoes with respect to the 
contract He asserted a right to the balance of the payments for 
the real estate and, after plaintiff filed the action, he counterclaimed 
for foreclosure. See Kunzman v. Thorsen, 303 Or. 600, 610, 740 
P.2d 754 (1987); Restatement (Second) Contracts §§ 328, 336. 
Under these circumstances, defendant also assumed the quasi-
contractual duty of seller to make restitution to plaintiff. Defendant 
must reimburse plaintiff $248,814.60, the money that purchasers and 
plaintiff paid . . . . 
Those circumstances are all present in this case except that American was not 
an assignee of the seller but was the seller itself and was totally involved in and aware of all 
the circumstances. It held the vendor's interest in the condominium to be released to 
Margetts upon receipt of the balance of the payments. It is unjustly enriched by having 
received what Margetts had paid for and did not receive. It had actual knowledge of the 
agreement and the payments made and was involved in the negotiation and closing of the 
contract. It stepped into the shoes of the prior parties who did receive payments from 
Margetts, it asserted a right to the balance of the payments for the condominium and it sued 
to enforce that contract. Under these circumstances, it also assumed the duty to make 
restitution to Margetts. 
In the Mallorv case, the Oregon Court of Appeals relied upon the prior case 
from the Supreme Court of Oregon, Kunzman v. Thorsen. supra, which carefully analyzed 
the Restatement of Contracts and numerous cases upon which the Restatement is based and 
concluded, at page 759: 
An assignee "claims the benefits" of a land sale contract when he or 
she exercises the rights in the contract's subject matter conferred 
upon the vendee by the contract. When a party accepts a broadly 
worded assignment of a land sale contract, "steps into the shoes" of 
the assignor and asserts the interests the contract conveys, the 
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presumption arises that the assignee intended also to assume the 
duties the contract imposes. 
Consistent with these cases is Irwin Concrete. Inc. v. Sun Coast Properties, Inc.. 33 
Wash.App. 190, 653 P.2d 1331 (Wash.App. 1982), which held that subcontractors on a real 
estate project, whose liens for unpaid work had been dismissed by foreclosure, could 
nevertheless recover the value of their work from the lender who had purchased the 
property at the trustee's sale. The lender, of course, had no contract with these 
subcontractors but did receive the property which had been improved by them. In our case, 
American was the lender on the project which it took over, not by foreclosure which would 
have eliminated all subordinate liens and interests, but by a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure and 
agreement by which it assumed responsibility for all outstanding liens and interests and 
stepped into the shoes of the developer. In the process, it assumed responsibility for all 
outstanding interests, including claims for restitution or reimbursement even though 
American may not have been the direct recipient of the money or benefits paid to its 
predecessors. It did, however, receive the property which had been totally paid for by 
Margetts to the predecessors and for which American agreed it was receiving value for which 
it was willing to allow a credit of $150,000. Requiring American, or its successor, New West, 
to reimburse funds to Margetts pursuant to an equitable claim of unconscionable forfeiture 
or unjust enrichment, is entirely consistent with all of the foregoing cases and with the 
general principle of law expressed in 77 AM JUR 2d, Vendor and Purchaser § 616, at page 
745: 
[A] person who takes a deed of land, but who is not entitled to 
protection as a bona fide purchaser, takes subject to the interest of 
another under a prior agreement by the vendor to convey. In the 
latter situation, the grantee takes the land impressed with a trust in 
favor of the original vendee. A fortiori, the grantee takes subject to 
the prior contract of sale, where he expressly takes subject thereto, 
or where the title was procured by assurance that the grantee would 
convey to the vendee under the executory contract. 
Allowing New West to escape that obligation and to keep, without reimbursement, the entire 
interest in the condominium, just because it is an assignee of the developers, is still 
unconscionable and contrary to the principles of equity expressed in the foregoing cases and 
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authorities. This Court's cursory treatment of this principle in its Memorandum Decision 
simply does not address these equitable principles. The cases clearly apply these principles 
to successors in interest to the seller and the buyer irrespective of whether or not those 
successors received the payments made or other value given by the buyer. The inequity is 
still present. The Court should keep in mind that the inequity involved in this case is seven 
times as bad as that in the prior Utah cases, that is, the ratio of the amount forfeited to the 
seller's actual damages in this case is seven times as great as the ratio held unconscionable 
in prior Utah cases which required reimbursement to the buyer. There is, therefore, far 
greater reason to apply the principle of unconscionable forfeiture in this case than in any 
prior reported case. 
POINT II 
QUANTUM MERUIT OR UNJUST ENRICHMENT WAS NOT 
PLEADED NOR PROVED BY NEW WEST AND CANNOT BE 
THE BASIS FOR THE RECOVERY OF RENTAL VALUE. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision recognized that the judgment for rental 
value was not based on a lease or similar possessory agreement providing for rent but, 
without reliance on any authority, stated that quantum meruit is the proper basis for such 
a judgment. This overlooked the requirement that quantum meruit must be based on a 
properly pleaded cause of action and upon proper proof. First Investment Co. v. Andersen, 
621 P.2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980). New West did not plead a cause of action for quantum 
meruit nor did it attempt to prove one. Unjust enrichment does not exist because Margetts 
has lost his entire $150,000 interest in the condominium and it is, therefore, not inequitable 
that he retain any benefit he may have received, which is an essential element of unjust 
enrichment. Concrete Products Co. v. Salt Lake County. 734 P.2d 910 (Utah 1987). It also 
overlooked the requirement that "recovery for quantum meruit presupposes that no 
enforceable written or oral contract exists." Karapanos v. Boardwalk Fries, Inc., 837 P.2d 
576,578 (Utah 1992). The existence of the Condominium Purchase Agreement, which New 
West elected not to enforce, precludes any application of unjust enrichment. The Court's 
reference to Bailev-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurset 876 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1994), as authority 
for an award based on quantum meruit is misplaced because in that case unjust enrichment 
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was both pleaded and proved and was awarded because there was no enforceable contract 
between the parties. That is not the case here. Accordingly, there is no basis for an award 
of rent. 
POINT III 
DAMAGES FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER WERE IMPROPER 
NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF LACK OF PROPER SERVICE ON 
MARGETTS BUT ALSO BECAUSE OF NO SERVICE ON HIS 
WIFE AND THE FAILURE TO QUALIFY UNDER THE STATUTE. 
The Memorandum Decision refused to consider Margetts' challenge to the 
unlawful detainer award simply because it claimed improper service was not raised as an 
affirmative defense. That, however, was not the only challenge to the unlawful detainer 
award. New West simply did not come within the terms of the unlawful detainer statute 
because there was no lease of the property for "an indefinite time with monthly or other 
periodic rent reserved", as required by §78-36-3(1 )(b), U.C.A., the only provision which could 
apply in this case. New West also failed to serve or join Mrs. Margetts in this action, who 
was also a resident in the condominium. Under the doctrine of Perkins v. Spencer. 121 
Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446, 449 (Utah 1952), the failure to serve and join Mrs. Margetts 
precludes a judgment for any more than nominal damages. 
POINT IV 
THE COURTS DEFERENCE TO THE LOWER COURT ON 
CREDIBILITY AS AN INSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY MISSED 
THE POINT THAT THE LOWER COURTS FINDINGS WERE 
NOT BASED ON CREDIBILITY BUT ON THE LEGAL ISSUE OF 
REASONABLENESS, 
This Court's refusal to review the findings of the lower court based on 
"institutional necessity" would be understandable if the lower court's findings had been based 
on the credibility or demeanor of the witnesses. But that was not the basis for the lower 
court's findings. Rather, the lower court based its findings on what it considered to have 
been reasonable. The court stated that "it was not reasonable for Defendant Margetts to 
rely upon any assumed representations or conduct by Mr. Snow." [R. 925, lines 17-19]. The 
lower court apparently recognized the impossibility of going back three years to determine 
credibility when it had not even considered that at the time of trial Instead, it tried to 
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determine what would have been reasonable under the circumstances. What is reasonable 
is a matter of law and can be determined by the appellate court without any deference to 
the lower court's determination. The adequacy of the findings of the lower court should, 
therefore, be reviewed by this Court. Credibility and demeanor of witnesses is not involved. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests a rehearing of this matter in order that the Court 
may properly and adequately consider: 
1) Whether the principle of unconscionable or unjust forfeiture should apply to 
an assignee or successor in interest who in fact received value from the buyer and is unjustly 
enriched by taking the entire interest in the condominium which is forfeited? 
2) Whether the principles of quantum meruit or unjust enrichment really exist 
in this case to justify an award of rental value against Margetts? 
3) Whether New West comes within the strict terms of the unlawful detainer 
statute and is entitled to damages thereunder when it failed to serve and join as a party 
Margetts' wife? 
4) Whether the findings of the lower court are adequate in view of the fact that 
they were based on reasonableness, a legal issue, rather than upon credibility and demeanor 
of witnesses? 
DATED this 9th day of November, 1994. 
BACJQ^Af^CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Marth 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ORME, Associate Presiding Judge: 
We again consider this case, in which defendant John L. 
Margetts appeals a judgment against him. This court previously 
remanded for the trial court's reconsideration of three issues. 
Margetts now appeals the judgment entered on remand, and also 
pursues the issues raised in his first appeal, which were not 
dealt with in our prior decision. 
SCOPE OF REMAND 
Margetts contends that the trial court, on remand, failed to 
follow the mandate of our prior decision. Our decision directed 
the trial court to make additional findings, "with leave to 
conduct such further proceedings as the trial court may deem 
appropriate," but deliberately did not prescribe any particular 
procedure. Acting on our broadly phrased mandate, the trial 
court scheduled a hearing, received memoranda and proposed 
findings from both sides, and heard oral arguments prior to 
issuing its supplementary findings and conclusions. We see no 
reversible error in the scope of the trial court's procedure on 
remand. 
ADEQUACY OF FINDINGS 
The supplementary factual findings on the issues of agency 
and fraud turn on the conflicting testimony of Margetts and 
attorney Gerald Snow concerning their meeting in Snow's office on 
November 14, 1984. While the trial court's findings are 
intellectually troubling because the court made judgments about 
the credibility and demeanor of witnesses three years after 
trial, as a matter of institutional necessity we have no choice 
but to defer to the trial court's determination in this respect. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Terry v. Price Mun. Corp.. 784 P.2d 
146, 147 (Utah 1989) (per curiam) (great deference given to 
findings based on conflicting live testimony); Mostrona v. 
Jackson. 866 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (witness credibility 
is within province of trial court), cert, denied, 878 P.2d 1154 
(Utah 1994). There is no recognized exception to the great 
deference shown to trial court decisions concerning witness 
credibility merely because significant time has elapsed between 
when the witness was heard and when the credibility decision was 
made.1 Accordingly, we cannot disturb the trial court's 
determination that Snow was not an agent of American Savings and 
Loan Association, and thus did not commit fraud for which 
American Savings and its successor, New West Savings and Loan, 
are answerable.2 
INCONSISTENT REMEDIES 
In our previous decision, we questioned the consistency of 
the trial courts determination that Margetts must forfeit 
$150,000 under the condominium sales contract with American 
Savings, while at the same time awarding fair renral value 
1. Practically speaking, the trial court at least heard the 
testimony in question and observed the two witnesses at a prior 
point in time. This court has never had that opportunity. 
2. Absent agency and fraud, Margetts's basic position becomes 
untenable. Without agency, the 20% agreement is not chargeable 
to American Savings, which was not a party to it. Without fraud, 
and given a common-sense reading of the 20% agreement, it clearly 
does not vest Margetts with the additional discounts to which he 
believes he is entitled. 
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damages to New West for the period during which Margetts had 
occupied the condominium without permission. Although the trial 
court's explanation on remand is sparse, our original perception 
of inconsistency appears to have reflected something of a 
misunderstanding. 
Under the condominium sales contract between Margetts and 
American Savings, the $150,000 credit did not represent money or 
tangible property actually paid to American Savings that would be 
subject to unjust forfeiture in favor of American Savings. 
Margetts conveyed his Park City condominium pursuant to a 
separate contract with different parties. While we deeply 
sympathize with Margetts's significant losses through the debt-
plagued financial wranglings in which the Garden Falls/Terrace 
Falls project's original partners engaged, the fact remains that 
American Savings negotiated a different contract with Margetts 
and received no money or tangible property in the amount of 
$150,000. The discount or credit American Savings offered 
Margetts in an effort to work out a deed-in-lieu resolution of 
the failing project simply does not equate to the cash payments 
that have been the subject of judicial intervention to set aside 
unconscionable forfeitures in the real estate contract context. 
See Soffe v. Ridd. 659 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah 1983) (forfeiture 
not enforced against buyer who paid $20,725 to seller); Johnson 
v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1977) (forfeiture not enforced 
against buyer who paid $34,596 to seller). 
Margetts is liable for the fair rental value for the period 
after he remained on the premises without permission, even absent 
a lease or similar possessory agreement. New West is therefore 
entitled to fair rental value on the basis of quantum meruit, 
even though no enforceable written or oral contract existed. 
Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App. 1994). 
INTEREST, TREBLE DAMAGES, AND ATTORNEY FEES 
The trial court erred in awarding prejudgment interest. To 
bear prejudgment interest, damages must be fixed with a 
mathematical certainty that is generally lacking when the 
doctrine of quantum meruit is relied upon. Id. at 427; Shoreline 
Dev.. Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah App. 1992). 
In this case, the trial court was only able to determine the fair 
rental value of Margetts's condominium through expert testimony 
and estimates made by the project's property manager. 
Accordingly, the requisite certainty was lacking. 
Margetts is liable for treble damages under the Utah 
unlawful detainer statute despite his contention that New West 
failed to comply with service requirements for the Notice to Quit 
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as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-6 (Supp. 1994).3 While 
improper service is a valid defense, it is waived unless 
explicitly raised by motion or as an affirmative defense. See 
Fowler v. Seiter. 838 P.2d 675, 678 (Utah App. 1992). The 
trebling of unlawful detainer damages is mandatory rather than 
discretionary. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3) (Supp. 1994). 
On remand, the trial court, while indicating there was merit 
in Margetts's argument, refused to reconsider the issue of 
attorney fees, based on a mistaken assumption that this court 
disposed of this issue by not addressing it in the prior 
Memorandum Decision. However, our previous decision was silent 
on the other issues, including attorney fees, only because the 
firs-c order of business was to secure adequate findings on the 
key issues which were remanded. It was not this court's intent 
to reduce the entire appeal to the three issues on remand. See 
Beltran v. Mvers. 701 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir.), cert, denied. 462 
U.S. 1134, 103 S.Ct. 3115 (1983). 
With limited exceptions not applicable here, attorney fees 
are awarded only if provided for by statute or contract. Dixie 
State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988); Tholen v. 
Sandy City, 849 P.2d 592, 596 (Utah App.), cert, denied/ 860 P.2d 
943 (Utah 1993). The only contract containing attorney fee 
provisions was the condominium sales agreement with American 
Savings which Margetts refused to perform. However, New West was 
granted remedies through the unlawful detainer statutes and 
principles of quantum meruit. In an unlawful detainer action, 
fees are awarded only if so provided by a lease or other 
possessory agreement. Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(3) (Supp. 1994). 
It is undisputed that no such lease or agreement existed. 
Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's award of attorney fees. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court's findings on the remanded issues 
of agency and fraud, and defer to its chosen procedural methods. 
There is no error in its award of rental value damages, which are 
3. The pertinent unlawful detainer provisions in effect at the 
time notice was served are substantively identical to the current 
codification. 
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required to be trebled. We vacate the award of prejudgment 
interest and attorney fees. 
Gregory K. Orme, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
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